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PRODUCT LIABILITY
David J Stout, JD.

Cipollone v. Liggitt Group, Inc.,
Federal Preemption and the Preservation of
State Common Law Claims

Federal preemption has become the "contributory negli
gence" of the 198Os. In virtually every case involving a defec
tive product you can anticipate the manufacturer or supplier
seeking refuge behind the tired refrain "the Government let me
do it." The scope and popularity of the preemption defense
expanded dramatically during the 198Os, an exquisite irony
given the politically fashionable criticism of "big government"
and the administration's efforts to free up business from the
constraints of federal redtape. Justice Stanley Mosk of the
California Supreme Court succinctly made this point:
There is a growing and ominous trend toward fed
eral preemption of issues that belong within the
sphere of control by the individual states. And these
inroads into traditional federalism are taking place
despite their inconsistency with the pious rhetoric
emanating from Washington about returning gov
ernment to the people at state and local levels.

preme Court in its last term decided a trio of cases which go a
long way toward stemming the preemption juggernaut. See
Cipollone v. Liggitt Group, Inc., 505 U.S. _, 120 L. Ed.2d
407, 422-23, 112 S.Ct._ (1992); Gade v. National Solid
Wastes, _U.S._, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L. Ed.2d 73, 84(1992);
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., U.S._, 112 S.Ct.
2031, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992). These three cases must be
reviewed and digested whenever an issue offederal preemption
arises.

What is this thing called preemption? At its most basic the
doctrine of preemption limits the operation of state law in areas
where Congress has intended that federal law be exclusive or
controlling. The constitutional basis for preemption derives
from the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution,
art. VI, cl. 2, which effectively empowers the federal legislature
to displace conflicting laws of the several states. See Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114 (1981). The
key to the doctrine of federal preemption is to understand that it
is entirely and exclusively a matter of congressional intent. See,
e.g., Cipollone v. Liggitt Group, Inc., 505 U.S._, 120 L.
Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Ed.2d 407, 422-23, 112 S.Ct. _ (1992); Louisiana Public
Rptr. 682, 692, 764 P.2d I059 (1988). The United State Su- Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,106 S. Ct. 1890,
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1899 (1986); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
The analysis begins with the "basic assumption that
Congress did not intend to displace state law." Maryland v.
Louisiana,451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114 (1981). Time and
again the Supreme Court has stated that "courts should not
lightly inf�r preemption," International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481,107 S. Ct. 805, 811 ( 1987), and there is a heavy
presumption against finding preemption, particularly where the
claim ofpreemption addresses the historic police powers ofthe
state, such as common law tort liability. See, e.g., Cipollone,
120 L.Ed.2d at 422; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 144; Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Company, 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984). "[W]e start
with the proposition that the historic police powers ofthe States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715
(1985). The Supreme Court, only last term, unequivocally
affirmed the "presumption against preemption of state police
power regulations," Cipollone, 120 L. Ed.2d at 424, such as
those involving public safety. The burden of demonstrating
federal preemption rests on the party claiming its benefit. See
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Corp. 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984);
Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F .2d 777, 780 (3d
Cir. 1992).

The importance ofthe recent Supreme Court cases is their
reaffirmation that the critical inquiry is to determine whether
there is some provision in the federal legislation which ad
dresses the scope of the federal law or a limitation upon the
operation ofstate law. Where Congress has expressly addressed
the preemptive scope of the federal law it is unnecessary to
"infer" or imply preemption. Cipollone, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422-23.
"When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and
has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly
addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a
'reliable indicium ofcongressional intent with respect to state
authority' ... 'there is no need to infer congressional intent to
preempt state laws from the substantive provisions of the
legislation." Cipollone, 120 L.Ed.2d at 423 (citations omitted).
Cipollone is the celebrated tobacco case which bounced
around the courts for some nine years. Rose Cipollone started
smoking in 1942. Rose contracted lung cancer, sued the Liggitt
Group in 1983 and died in 1984. The Cipollone case involved
the preemptive effect of the Federal Cigarette Labelling and
Advertising Act of 1965 and its successor the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. The issue was the extent to
which the warning requirements of the Acts preempted state
common law claims for failure to warn, breach of warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy. Cipollone's de
sign defect claim for safer alternatives was not at issue because
the federal act clearly did not address that subject area.
The Court's analysis turned on the specific language of
the statute that addressed the scope of the labelling require
ments. Each statute contained slightly different language with
regard to the federal labelling requirements. The pertinent
language from the 1965 Act was:
[N]o statement relating to smoking and health shall
be required in the advertising ofany cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions ofthis Act.

Congressional intent may be "'explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose."' Cipollone, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422-23 quoting Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Express preemp
tion requires that there be a specific provision in the federal
statutory scheme that addresses the question of what Congress
intended to preempt. For example, the Employee Retirement
and Income Security Act has a provision that provides: "[t]he
provisions ofthis subchapter...shall supersede any and all State The corresponding language from the 1969 Act was:
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
and health shall be imposed under State law with
respect to the advertising or promotion ofany ciga
Assuming then that there is no express language in the
rettes the packages ofwhich are labeled in confor
federal legislation which addresses preemption, then there are
mity with the provisions ofthis Act.
two primary species ofimplied preemption. First, an intention
to preempt can be inferred when the legislation is so comprehen The Supreme Court held that the 1965 Act was limited to state
sive that it leaves no room for the states to supplement federal statutory or regulatory action and a unanimous Court concluded
law ("field preemption"). See California Federal Savings and that the 1965 Act did not preempt state common law tort claims.
Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987); Gade
The Court fragmented on the preemptive effect of the
v.National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 1969 Act. The majority found that some of the claims were
_, 120 L.Ed. 2d 73, 84, 112 S.Ct._ (1982). Second, an preempted such as fraudulent misrepresentation, because they
intention to preempt a specific state law can also be inferred if related so closely to the area that the amendment addressed, that
the state law "actually conflicts" with the federal law ("conflicts is, advertising ofthe product, and that some ofthe claims, such
preemption"). Id. Such an "actual conflict" will only be found as breach ofwarranty, were not. See Cipollone, 120 L.Ed.2d at
where "compliance with both federal and state [law] is a 428-29 (Section V of the Court's opinion). The Court also
physical impossibility" or "the state law stands as an obstacle to concluded that a common law tort claim would constitute the
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of type of"requirement or prohibition" as opposed to "statement"
Congress." California Federal, 479 U.S. at 281; Gade v. which Congress intended would be excluded by the Act. The
National Solid Wastes Management Association, 120 L. Ed. important point for the purposes ofthis short discussion is that
2d at 84.
seven members ofthe Court, all except for Scalia and Thomas,
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agreed that the proper analytic approach is to parse the specific were different from those created by OSHA. A plurality of the
language in the federal statute in order to determine the scope of Court agreed with O'Connor that OSHA impliedly preempted
the Illinois regulations because they conflicted with the federal
the preemption.
regulations
and the overall purpose of the federal act.
The Cipollone decision focuses the central and control
ling inquiry on the express preemptive language of the statute.
A majority of the Court determined, however, that it was
The majority in Cipollone described its holding as:
unnecessary to conduct an implied conflicts analysis because
the scope of preemption was expressly addressed by the lan
a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a
guage of the federal statute itself. Thus, Kennedy found that
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a stat
OSHA expressly preempted the claims and the four dissenters
ute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
concluded that the language of OSHA was "insufficient to
preempted.
demonstrate an intent to preempt state law," Gade, 120 L.Ed. 2d
Cipollone, 120 L. Ed.2d at 423. Where the federal legislation at 96, Souter, J. dissenting, and that Congress intended to permit
addresses the issue of preemption, Congress will be presumed overlapping state and federal regulations. The point here again
to have limited the preemptive effect of the statute to those areas is that a majority of the Court focused the analysis solely on the
addressed by the legislation and the courts are not to infer an express language of the Act.
intent to preempt matters not specifically addressed in the
Finally, in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
legislation. "Absent explicit preemptive language", there is no U.S._, 119 L.Ed.2d 157, 112 S.Ct. _(1992) the Court ad
express preemption and the analysis must be one of implied dressed whether the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempts
preemption. Gade v. National Solid Wastes, _U.S._, 112 states from prohibiting deceptive fare advertisements through
S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73, 84 (1992). Thus, where Congress the states' general consumer protection statutes through the
has spoken directly to the preemptive scope of the statute there National Association of Attorneys General guidelines. The
can be no implied preemption.
federal act contained an express preemption provision which
One of the few points of common agreement between the prohibited states from enforcing any law "relating to rates,
majority, dissenters, and concurring justices was that the plain routes, or services of any air carrier." Morales, 119 L.Ed.2d at
holding of the Cipollone majority limited the application of 164. The Court simply concluded that the enforcement of the
implied preemption analysis to those circumstances where NAAG consumer protection guidelines would, as a matter-of
Congress did not address the scope of the federal legislation in statutory construction, "relate to" rates and services of air
the statutory scheme. Black.mun writing for himself, Souter and carriers. Id. at 168-70. The Court therefore concluded that the
federal law preempted the state laws at issue. The salient feature
Kennedy concluded that:
of
the case is its emphasis and focus on the plain words of the
"Where, as here, Congress has included in legislation a
preemption
provision of the statute.
specific provision addressing - and indeed, entitled pre-emption, the Court's task is one of statutory interpre
Those courts which have applied the Cipollone preemp
tation - only to "identify the domain expressly pre
tion
analysis
have concluded that the implied preemption analy
empted" by the provision. Ante, at_ 120 L.Ed 2d, at 423.
An interpreting court must "begin with the language sis is dead where Congress has addressed preemption in the
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordi legislation. Thus, Judge Weinstein in Burke v. Dow Chemical
nary meaning of that language accurately expresses the Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), a case involving the
legislative purpose."
preemptive effect ofFederal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden
Cipollone, 120 L.Ed 2d at 432, Blackmun, J. concurring quot ticide Act, concluded that "in light of Cipollone, then, courts
ing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,_ (1990). Scalia must focus on the specific wording of preemption clauses,
characterized the majority's holding in his dissent joined by interpreting them narrowly in light of the presumption against
Justice Thomas as quite simply "Once there is an express preemption." Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1140. The court in Burke
preemption provision, in other words, all doctrines of implied found that Cipollone directs an exclusive focus on express
preemption are eliminated.. ." Cipollone, 120 L.Ed 2d at 442, preemption clauses. Id. at 1141. So too, the Tenth Circuit in
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th
Scalia, J., dissenting.
Cir. 1993) recognized that Cipollone limits inquiry to express
The case of Gade v. National Solid Wastes Manage reach of statute where legislation includes preemption provi
ment Association, 505 U.S. _, 120 L.Ed. 2d, 112 S.Ct. sion.
_(1982) confirms that preemption inquiry ends where Con
In Cleveland, Piper Aircraft argued that the Federal
gress expressly addresses the scope of the federal legislation. In
Aviation
Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder pre
Gade the Occupational Safety and Health Administration pro
mulgated regulations implementing certain standards for the empted plaintiffs state law tort claims because Congress in
training of workers handling hazardous wastes pursuant to the tended to preempt the entire field of airplane safety.Piper did
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. In not argue that the Act expressly preempted plaintiffs claims
1988 Illinois enacted a Hazardous Waste Crane and Hoisting since the Act did not contain an express preemption provision
Equipment Operators Licensing Act the dual purpose of which relating to airplane safety. The Tenth Circuit rejected Piper's
was to protect both workers and the general public. The Illinois argument and held that the "savings clause" contained in the
act contained certain training and experience provisions which FAA indicated a congressional intent not to occupy the field and
June, 199! June,
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that together with the absence of an express preemption provi
sion addressing safety established that " Congress intended to
allow state common law to stand side by side with the system of
federal regulations it has developed." Cleveland, 985 F.2d at
1444.The court also rejected Piper's claim for conflict preemp
tion.The importance of Cleveland is that it constitutes a post
Cipollone analysis recognizing that "implied preemption is
general inapplicable to a federal statute that contains an express
preemption provision." Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443.

mance of such vehicle or item of equipment which
is not identical to the federal standard."

The classic example of some courts' misguided analysis
involves the airbag claims and The National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act ("the Safety Act"). See 15 U.S.C.§ § 138 1
to 143 1. The Safety Act expressly preserves common law
remedies for design defects through its "savings clause" and
expressly provides that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor
vehicle safety standard ...does not exempt any person from
liability under common law." See 15 U.S.C, § 1397(k) (The
1988 amendments to the Safety Act changed the lettering of this
section from 1397(c) to 1397(k).) The Safety Act also includes
an express preemption provision which provides in pertinent
part that:
"§ 130 2(d) Whenever a federal motor vehicle safety
standard established under this subchapter is in
effect, no State or political subdivision of a State
shall have any authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle
or item of motor vehicle equipment for any safety
standard applicable to the same aspect of perfor-

395, ( 1st Cir.1988) (no express preemption, but implied con
flicts preemption; Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F. 2d
787 (10th Cir.1989) (follows Wood analysis); Taylor v. Gen
eral Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (I Ith Cir. 1989) (rejected
express preemption, but found an implied conflict preemption);
Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 90 2 F. 2d 1116 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(holding no express preemption, but finding an implied conflict
preemption analysis with regard to the failure to install airbags
claims).Under Cipollone that analysis of the Safety Act can no
longer stand and the failure to include airbag claims should be
reconsidered as a potential basis for design defect claims.

15 U.S.C. § 139 2(d). Because these two provisions specifically
address the scope of the federal legislation the role of the Court
after Cipollone is simply to determine the extent of the Act's
express coverage because Congress included provisions in the
Safety Act that specifically address its preemptive scope.Those
provisions are determinative and conclusive under Cipollone
and there can be no implied preemption based on some manu
Why is it important that these cases and in particular factured "conflict" between state and federal law.
Cipollone return the analysis to the plain language of a preemp
This point is significant because that aberrant line of
tion provision? The reason is that a number of courts have gone airbag cases holding that failure to include an airbag claim was
beyond the language employed by Congress and have found preempted by the Safety Act were virtually all decided on the
state laws preempted in contexts where there are express provi basis of implied conflicts preemption.Those courts holding that
sions relating to the scope of the federal legislation or the the failure to include airbag claims are impliedly preempted
limitation on state law.Cipollone sounds the death knell for the have found a conflict between a common law claim requiring an
implied preemption analysis where the federal legislation ad airbag and F MVS S 208 which allowed a choice among restraint
dresses the scope or preemptive sweep of federal law.
systems.See, e.g., Woods v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d

June, 1993 June, 1993

It is to be hoped that the wave of federal preemption has
crested and that the federal courts will, under the specific
guidance of Cipollone, be less inclined to look beyond the
expressed purpose of Congress to find state common law tort
claims preempted.
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